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INTRODUCTION 
Several factors can increase the risk of war between states. But war primarily occurs when 
states believe (or, in fact, misbelieve, according to the Bargaining Model of War) that the 
likely benefits of combat outweigh the expected costs. Finding ways to prevent conflict in the 
first place—or a peaceful resolution to it once fighting has broken out—remains of vital 
interest to policymakers and scholars alike. If conflict belligerents cannot find a peaceful 
solution by themselves, international mediation is a frequently used tool. International 
mediation pertains to a third party getting involved in a dispute with the aim to ease the 
conflict peacefully for the belligerents. A mediator entering a conflict usually becomes part of 
it by manipulating the actors’ behavior and, as a result, the choices the opposing parties have. 
But how can and do international organizations (IOs hereafter) mediate, and thus, alleviate a 
conflict? IOs frequently employ different methods than state mediators, including peaceful 
interventions aiming to improve states’ relations or directly resolve rivalries. This article 
seeks to review the existing positivist literature on this and related questions. The review 
begins by offering definitions and a brief overview of the main components of the article, i.e., 
international mediation and IOs. The relevant work in the broader field of research is also 
discussed by looking at different methodological approaches: qualitative and quantitative 
studies. The article then proceeds by examining IOs’ role in the international system more 
generally as I discuss some crucial studies dealing with the question of why states delegate 
(at least some) power to IOs in the first place. To this end, the review also illustrates some 
concepts that are necessary for the study and understanding of IOs, i.e., international 
cooperation more broadly defined, centralization, socialization, and compliance. Against this 
background, we are then able to address the link between mediation and IOs. In particular, 
the review illustrates the reasons why and how IOs mediate. These thought-provoking ideas 
offer an illustration of the role of IOs as mediators. The article finishes with an outlook of the 
consequences of mediation via IOs, particularly in light of the fact that mediators usually aim 
not only to reach a settlement, resolve the conflict, and produce a peace agreement, but also 
to secure post-conflict stability. 
GENERAL OVERVIEWS 
This review first discusses those studies that offer a general synopsis of this article, i.e., 
international mediation and IOs. It also addresses the underlying and broader research field of 
IOs and points to the literature dealing with methodological aspects, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. This section thus provides the necessary background information, definitions, 
and literature. Based on this, we are then able to move to more detailed aspects of mediation 
employed by IOs. 
International Mediation 
Bercovitch, et al. 1991, p. 3 defines mediation as “a process of conflict management where 
disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, 
or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical 
force or invoking the authority of the law.” A similar definition is given by the 
comprehensive study Touval and Zartman 1985: mediation is “a mode of negotiation in 
which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find by themselves.” 
Examples of international mediation pertain to the efforts by the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) representative and Swiss Diplomat, Heidi Tagliavini, 
leading to the Minsk Protocol in 2014 or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO 
hereafter) trying to mediate in the Kosovo conflict at the end of the 1990s. Different actors 
can provide international mediation. A third-party mediator might be a state, a 
nongovernmental organization, a private individual, a representative from a religious or 
secular institution, or a regional or global IO (Crocker, et al. 1999, p. 6). 
Bercovitch, Jacob, Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette Wille. “Some Conceptual Issues and 
Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations.” Journal 
of Peace Research 28.1 (1991): 7–17.  
One of the first systematic examinations of mediation. The paper focuses on (1) the nature 
of the disputing parties, (2) the nature of the dispute itself, (3) the identity and 
characteristics of the mediator, and (4) the strategies and tactics which the mediator 
employs. In addition, this paper provides one of the most commonly used definitions of 
international mediation. 
Crocker, Chester, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation 
in a Complex World. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1999.  
Based on a concise theoretical framework, the book comprises personal experiences of 
practitioners in the field of international mediation, working on bringing peace in 
significant conflicts across the world. Each chapter is a different case where each author 
delineates mediation processes, mediation processes, and the role of the actors involved in 
the conflict. 
Touval, Saadia, and Zartman William, eds. International Mediation in Theory and Practice. 
Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985.  
This edited volume discusses the basic concepts of international mediation, onset 
effectiveness, and the actors involved in a dispute. In the introductory chapter, one can find 
a widely used definition of mediation. 
International Organizations 
According to Pevehouse, et al. 2004, an IO consists of more than two member states and is 
usually established by a treaty. For example, the Treaty of Maastricht (signed by the parties 
in 1992) established the European Union in 1993. That treaty defines the mandate of an IO, 
which specifies its scope. An IO treaty thus delineates in advance the policy goals that the 
institution aims to achieve. For example, some IOs focus on security aspects, e.g., NATO, 
and others might focus on trade agreements, e.g., the World Trade Organization (WTO 
hereafter). IOs, finally, have rules and norms that are defined through their functioning and 
decision-making procedures. Hence, IOs vary along several dimensions including rules for 
membership, scope of issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the 
institution, and flexibility of arrangements (Koremenos, et al. 2001). Along these lines, an IO 
might be of global scope, e.g., the United Nations (UN hereafter) or regional scope, e.g., the 
African Union (Hansen, et al. 2008). Abbott, et al. 2000 explains the design of IOs with 
regards to degrees of legalization that characterize IOs along three dimensions: obligation, 
precision, and delegation. The related work Abbott and Snidal 2000 links these dimensions to 
the broader categories of “soft” and “hard law.” 
Abbott, Kenneth, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan 
Snidal. “The Concept of Legalization.” International Organization 54.3 (2000): 401–419.  
The study focuses on the concept of legalization as a form of institutionalization. 
Legalization is characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and delegation. 
Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” 
International Organization 54.3 (2000): 421–456.  
The study examines the spectrum of IO design along legalization. It scales legalization from 
soft agreements to hard legal arrangements in light of the dimensions of obligation, 
precision, and delegation. 
Hansen, Holley, Sara Mitchell, and Stephen Nemeth. “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: 
Moving beyond the Global vs. Regional Dichotomy.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52.2 
(2008): 295–325.  
The paper shows that IOs will be more successful conflict managers if they are highly 
institutionalized, if they have members with homogeneous preferences, and if they have 
more established democratic members. 
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. “The Rational Design of 
International Institutions.” International Organization 55.4 (2001): 761–799.  
The study introduces a theoretical framework for IOs based on the rational design project. 
The paper illustrates five features of institutions, i.e., membership, scope, centralization, 
control, and flexibility. To this end, the study explains the variation of these features in 
terms of indicators that characterize different cooperation issues, e.g., distribution, number 
of actors, enforcement, or uncertainty. 
Pevehouse, Jon, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. “The Correlates of War 2 
International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0.” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 21.2 (2004): 101–119.  
This article introduces the Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations 
(IGOs) data. These data capture state memberships in the network of IOs from 1815 to 
2005 in a time-series cross-section format. 
Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches 
Scholars have studied the topic of IO and mediation with different methods. Multiple 
approaches that combine diverse (theoretical and) methodological ways are necessary in 
order to derive findings that can improve our understanding of the practice and performance 
of mediation in a comprehensive way (Bercovitch 1996). On one hand, Crocker, et al. 2001 
compiled a rich and detailed set of case studies on mediation, with a particular focus on 
multiparty mediation. The more recent work Bakaki 2016 describes mediation offered by 
NATO in the Cod Wars to make causal inferences regarding formal and informal mediation 
procedures. On the other hand, quantitative (large-N) studies seek to provide a general 
overview of the characteristics of IOs that increase the likelihood of conflict resolution. For 
instance, Bercovitch and Gartner 2006 thoroughly examined conflict management outcomes 
and suggested that mediating actors, the strategy they choose, and previous mediation 
experiences are some of the influential elements for the nature of a conflict management 
outcome. Bercovitch and Schneider 2000 examine the identity of mediators and the factors 
determining the choice of mediators. The authors test their hypotheses with a multivariate 
event count model using an original dataset on international mediation since 1950 and find 
that powerful states and IOs are the most prominent choices for mediators. 
Bakaki, Zorzeta. “Deconstructing Mediation: A Case Study of the Cod Wars.” Negotiation 
Journal 32.1 (2016): 63–78.  
This study explores the mediation techniques used by NATO to settle the Cod Wars 
between Iceland and Britain. The analysis indicates that a combination of both formal and 
informal mediation techniques was key in resolving the Cod Wars. 
Bercovitch, Jacob. Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation. 
London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996.  
The book consists of an excellent collection of case studies on conflict resolution. In many 
of these cases, IOs have been the main mediators. 
Bercovitch, Jacob, and Scott Sigmund Gartner. “Is There Method in the Madness of 
Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation.” 
International Interactions 32.4 (2006): 329–354.  
This is an article on the various types of conflict management outcomes and the mitigating 
influence of dispute intensity as drivers of mediation effectiveness. 
Bercovitch, Jacob, and Gerald Schneider. “Who Mediates? The Political Economy of 
International Conflict Management.” Journal of Peace Research 37.2 (2000): 145–165.  
The purpose of this study is to identify the attributes of those actors who are most likely to 
mediate in international relations. The results indicate that the most powerful states and IOs 
dominate international conflict management. 
Crocker, Chester, Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of 
Managing International Conflict. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2001.  
This edited volume investigates recent conflicts and a broad set of conflict management 
strategies from a qualitative perspective. It offers answers on how best to prevent, manage, 
or resolve conflicts, with a particular focus on mediation. 
DELEGATING POWER TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Literature in the field of IOs has particularly focused on the aspect of power delegation to 
“agents” (Tsebelis 2002, p. 238, Grant and Keohane 2005, Bradley and Kelley 2008). These 
agents are institutions (i.e., IOs) with expertise over specific matters. States give authority to 
IOs and let them take decisions on their behalf if they believe that they can derive more 
effectiveness or efficiency out of this (Barnett and Duvall 2005). This is why IOs have been 
studied as sets of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that constrain and empower 
member states and, ultimately, serve to facilitate international cooperation. Additionally, 
literature refers to the aspects of centralization, socialization, and compliance as further 
consequences of delegating power to IOs. States join IOs for efficiency gains, legitimacy 
reasons, or, more generally, to reduce transaction costs (Pollack 2003, p. 29). Hawkins, et al. 
2006 refers to the principal- agent theory to explain why states join IOs. That is, states (i.e., 
principals) delegate authority to IOs (i.e., agents) with expertise in specific areas. For 
example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) promotes the peaceful use of 
atomic energy. Since many consequences of IOs, such as their performance in conflict 
resolution, are directly related to states’ rationale on why delegating power in the first place, 
a thorough understanding of the latter is necessary for our assessment of IOs in the context of 
international mediation. 
Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. “Power in International Politics.” International 
Organization 59.1 (2005): 39–75.  
This paper discusses the concept of power in interstate relations and suggests two 
dimensions of power: social relations through which power works and the specificity of 
social relations through which effects are produced. These distinctions lead to the taxonomy 
of power in four concepts: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power. 
Bradley, Curtis, and Judith Kelley. “The Concept of International Delegation.” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 71.1 (2008): 1–36.  
The article offers a conceptualization of the institutional features of delegation. The 
different forms of delegations lie on the various costs and benefits that states get by 
delegating power to IOs. 
Grant, Ruth, and Robert Keohane. “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics.” 
American Political Science Review 99.1 (2005): 29–43.  
This article stresses the importance of accountability in the international system. It 
distinguishes between participation and delegation models of accountability. It identifies 
seven types of accountability mechanisms and considers their applicability to states, NGOs, 
multilateral organizations, multinational corporations, and transgovernmental networks. 
Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, eds. Delegation and 
Agency in International Organizations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
This book offers an analysis of the reasoning of states choosing to cooperate via IOs. An 
examination of different IOs such as the WTO, the UN, and the European Commission 
offers readers an understanding of how states try to fulfill their interests via IOs. The 
underlying theory is based on the principal-agent framework, which this study covers and 
summarizes nicely as well. 
Pollack, Mark. The Engines of Integration? Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the 
European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.  
The book is an analysis of states’ incentives to delegate power to EU bodies including the 
Commission, the Court of Justice, and the European Parliament and how this has affected 
the process of European integration. 
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002.  
The book provides a thorough examination of states’ interaction in IOs. Policy outcomes 
differ depending on who controls political power in the institution as well as on where the 
status quo is. 
International Cooperation 
IOs promote cooperation over different policy areas—depending on their expertise and 
scope—and thus are capable of reducing transaction costs. Hence, states can create links and 
establish and foster good relations via IOs. Cooperation among states, for instance, may 
include trade agreements or peace contracts, and these are usually promoted by, linked with, 
and heavily influenced by IOs (Dorussen and Ward 2008, Böhmelt 2009). Haftel 2013 finds 
that regional IOs implementing broad regional policies are more likely to have independent 
secretariats and strong dispute settlement. Literature has particularly focused on the benefits 
of international cooperation for dispute prevention and resolution. For example, Greig and 
Diehl 2006 highlights that a key aspect of alleviating disputes refers to the decrease of 
transaction costs. States that interact via different links face low transaction costs, and thus 
have a greater incentive to reach an agreement and not to abuse it in the future (Greig and 
Diehl 2006). 
Böhmelt, Tobias. “International Mediation and Social Networks: The Importance of Indirect 
Ties.” International Interactions 35.3 (2009): 298–319.  
This study shows that although direct links can indicate mutual interests, shared 
preferences, and decreased uncertainty between warring parties, these ties either lose 
importance or become cut off when states enter a conflict. By contrast, indirect ties create a 
social network that involves outside parties in the dispute process, and indirect ties increase 
the exchange of information between belligerents and potential mediators and the chances 
that third parties will have a vital interest in intervention. 
Dorussen, Han, and Hugh Ward. “Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace: A 
Network Perspective.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52.2 (2008): 189–212.  
IOs memberships create network ties among states, allowing them, either individually or 
collectively, to intervene more effectively in latent conflicts. The IO network also provides 
direct and indirect communication channels, where indirect links can act as partial 
substitutes for direct diplomatic ties. 
Greig, Michael J., and Paul Diehl. “Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to 
Diplomacy.” International Interactions 32.4 (2006): 355–384.  
The paper shows that states are more willing to use diplomatic alternatives when they bear 
high costs and have reason to expect good results from negotiation and mediation. In 
addition, positive interactions such as trading relationships and common IGO memberships 
are more effective at keeping states from becoming militarized rivals than they are in 
managing those conflictual relationships when they do occur. 
Haftel, Yoram. “Commerce and Institutions: Trade, Scope, and the Design of Regional 
Economic Organizations.” The Review of International Organizations 8.3 (2013): 389–414.  
This research focuses on the design of regional economic IOs. It examines the impact of 
regional economic IOs on regional cooperation. 
Centralization 
Centralization refers to a concrete, stable, and supportive administrative apparatus (structure) 
of an institution. An IO is a very central authority if it has the institutional and structural 
capacity to directly support state interactions. In particular, Hooghe and Marks 2015 suggests 
that the authority of an IO is conditioned by two basic factors: the scale of its membership 
and the scope of its policy portfolio. Literature classifies states’ interactions over the 
following actions offered by IOs: (1) negotiation forum, (2) fast response to sudden 
problems, (3) issue linkage, (4) precise terms for interactions, (5) secretariat, (6) supportive 
functions (e.g., background research). Abbott and Snidal 1998 explains that centralization 
fulfills various functions: facilitating the negotiations and implementations of agreements, 
managing or resolving disputes, offering technical assistance, elaborating norms, and shaping 
international discourse. 
Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. “Why States Act through Formal International 
Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42.1 (1998): 3–32.  
This article addresses the question of why states use formal organizations. It examines 
power and distributive questions and the role of IOs in creating norms and understanding. 
Centralization and independence are identified as the key properties of formal 
organizations, and their importance is illustrated with a wide array of examples. 
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. “Delegation and Pooling in International Organizations.” 
The Review of International Organizations 10.3 (2015): 305–328.  
This paper theorizes that delegation and pooling are constrained by two basic design 
features: (1) the scope of an IO’s policy portfolio and (2) the scale of its membership. The 
larger the organization, the more delegation and pooling exist. At the same time, when an 
IO has a broader mandate and policy focus, the members are more willing to delegate 
power to them. 
Socialization 
Hooghe 2005 (p. 865) refers to socialization as the process of inducting individuals into the 
norms and rules of a given community. A fundamental issue in the study of IOs is the 
emergence of social norms and how states adopt IOs’ values and norms. Once states become 
part of an IO, they gradually adopt the social norms that an IO promotes (Kelley 2004). This 
is part of the socialization process, i.e., incorporating a new member into a society. Similarly, 
in the international system, socialization occurs when an IO accepts a new member. In turn, 
the new member will adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors accepted and practiced 
by an ongoing system (the IO in this case). In the international system, socialization occurs 
via two mechanisms: persuasion and social influence (Johnston 2001). This means that IOs 
directly influence states’ decisions via persuasion and social influence. Social influence is 
made possible via the IO links that states generate with other member states. That is, states 
tend to behave similarly to their co-members in IOs. Common interests lead to common 
behavior and, thus, more cooperation and eventually less conflict. In essence, socialization is 
part of the range of behaviors that IOs promote in the international system to create balance 
and peaceful relations (Finnemore 1993, Bearce and Bondanella 2007). 
Bearce, David, and Stacy Bondanella. “Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and 
Member-State Interest Convergence.” International Organization 61.4 (2007): 703–733.  
This paper tests the institutional socialization hypothesis, arguing that IOs merge states’ 
interests and guide them into common goals. 
Finnemore, Martha. “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy.” International 
Organization 47.4 (1993): 565–597.  
This study shows how IOs influence states’ choices for domestic policies. State policies and 
structures are influenced by “intersubjective systemic factors,” specifically by norms 
diffused within the international system. 
Hooghe, Liesbeth. “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International 
Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission.” International Organization 
59.4 (2005): 861–898.  
The paper focuses on how time, organizational structure, alternative processes of preference 
formation, and national socialization influence international socialization. 
Johnston, Alastair. “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.” International 
Studies Quarterly 45.4 (2001): 487–516. 
The paper shows that persuasion and social influence determine whether actors will 
cooperate. It develops propositions about the social conditions under which one might 
expect to observe cooperation in institutions. 
Kelley, Judith. “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and 
Socialization by International Institutions.” International Organization 58.3 (2004): 425–
457.  
IOs aim to shape international politics, but at the same time they also influence domestic 
politics. This paper studies such arguments via case studies of the Baltic and Central 
European countries. 
Compliance 
Another institutional aspect of IOs refers to the element of compliance. Why do states 
comply with IOs’ policies and laws (Chayes and Chayes 1993)? States usually have a 
genuine interest in complying with IOs due to the transaction cost argument, but they might 
fail in doing so, because of the lack of either willingness (e.g., private benefits) or 
opportunity (e.g., lack of capacity). Lake 2010 argues that high rates of compliance with 
international agreements are merely the by-product of states entering only those agreements 
with which they already intended to comply. Existing literature also refers to reputational 
costs, as states’ reputational concerns are another central mechanism for states’ compliance 
(Hafner-Burton 2008, DeMeritt 2012). States try to avoid the social stigma of non-credible 
actors, because this will prevent them from other cooperation in the future (Lebovic and 
Voeten 2006, Simmons 2010). An IO may also make use of the more direct avenues of 
enforcement in order to foster agreement compliance (i.e., sanctions). Enforcement may be 
necessary to prevent widespread defiance and, thus, the erosion of authority. In essence, both 
approaches—monitoring and enforcement—that an IO can employ to ensure compliance with 
post-conflict agreements rely on IOs’ leverage and legitimacy (Chapman and Wolford 2010). 
Chapman, Terrence, and Scott Wolford. “International Organizations, Strategy, and Crisis 
Bargaining.” The Journal of Politics 72.1 (2010): 227–242.  
The study offers a game theoretical model to explain how IOs’ decisions can affect a 
challenger state’s costs for the outside option of war. The analysis shows that the aggregate 
effect of IO involvement on the likelihood of war depends on the strategic decisions of 
challengers to initially consult the organization. 
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. “On Compliance.” International Organization 
47.2 (1993): 175–205.  
This study promotes the interdisciplinary study of international law and international 
relations in order to understand compliance with international agreements. 
DeMeritt, Jacqueline. “International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming 
and Shaming Save Lives?” International Interactions 38.5 (2012): 597–621.  
The study examines how naming and shaming via IOs influences governments. First, 
naming and shaming threatens leaders with immediate legal and/or economic punishment. 
Second, shaming threatens perpetrators with punishment. Finally, shaming threatens leaders 
by raising the risk of sending an order and having it subsequently disobeyed. 
Hafner-Burton, Emilie. “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights 
Enforcement Problem.” International Organization 62.4 (2008): 689–716.  
This article examines the effectiveness of naming and shaming for making countries 
comply with human rights agreements. The paper analyzes the relationship between global 
naming-and-shaming efforts and governments’ human rights practices for 145 countries 
from 1975 to 2000. 
Lake, David. “Rightful Rules: Authority, Order, and the Foundations of Global Governance.” 
International Studies Quarterly 54.3 (2010): 587–613.  
The paper revaluates the study of authority in global governance. It suggests that global 
governance and its many forms can be understood and unified by a concept of relational 
authority, which treats authority as a social contract in which a governor provides a political 
order of value to a community in exchange for compliance by the governed with the rules 
necessary to produce that order. 
Lebovic, James, and Erik Voeten. “The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and 
Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators.” Journal of Peace Research 50.4 
(2006): 861–888.  
This article argues that “shaming” in the UN Commission on Human Rights provided 
substantive information about rights abuses and gave political cover for the World Bank 
and other institutions seeking to sanction human rights violators. 
Simmons, Beth. “Treaty Compliance and Violation.” Annual Review of Political Science 13 
(2010): 273–296.  
This is a review of the literature in four issues areas in the field of international relations; 
security, war, and peace; international trade; protection of the environment; and human 
rights. 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS MEDIATORS 
On 3 October 2016, Turkey requested consultations with Morocco from the WTO regarding 
the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures (see the online *Chronological list of 
disputes cases[https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm This shows 
that many IOs offer dispute settlement mechanisms regardless of their mandate. Nonetheless, 
these types of mechanisms have not always been effective measures for conflict prevention 
and the restoration of peace. The primary challenge that IOs face into preventing conflict is 
the issue of resources (Ramsbotham, et al. 2011, p. 138). Additionally, Touval 1994 argues 
that the UN, due to its multilateral character, cannot coordinate a conflict and ultimately 
resolve it. On the contrary, the institutional structure of IOs offers techniques of conflict 
resolution which are not available from other actors, i.e., bargaining, information processing, 
and decision making (Snyder and Diesing 1978). The literature usually explains mediation 
along four main clusters of determinants: the likelihood of eventual mediation success, 
conflict management history, how domestic and international threats faced by the warring 
parties influence mediation onset, and the characteristics of the conflict dyad (Elgström, et al. 
2003; Greig and Diehl 2006). IOs prevent conflict onset, but the scholarly work has also 
started exploring whether these same organizations help their members manage disputes 
(Kadera and Mitchell 2006). For instance, Boehmer, et al. 2004 argues that IOs require a 
certain degree of institutional structure in order to effectively intervene and resolve conflicts 
and, thus, divides IOs according to their degree of institutionalization: minimal (having 
meetings and information gathering), structured (having policy agendas), and interventionist 
(having mediation mechanisms). Additionally, Shannon 2009 highlights not only that IOs are 
interested in brokering peace to better provide collective goods, but that a number of IOs also 
formed with the explicit purpose of helping countries peacefully manage their grievances. 
Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. “Do Intergovernmental 
Organizations Promote Peace?” World Politics 57.1 (2004): 1–38.  
The effect of IO memberships on cooperation varies depending on institutional structure, 
mandate, and member cohesion. Specifically, IOs with security mandates and the most 
sophisticated institutional structures are likely to influence disputes. 
Elgström, Ole, Jacob Bercovitch, and Carl Skau. “Regional Organizations and International 
Mediation: The Effectiveness of Insider Mediators.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 
3.1 (2003): 11–27.  
This paper explains why regional organizations are better in dealing with intrastate conflict 
than, for instance, the UN. Employing the case of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) interventions in West Africa, this study argues that regional 
organizations are well connected to the conflict at hand, and they have good knowledge 
about local conditions. 
Greig, Michael J., and Paul F. Diehl. “Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to 
Diplomacy.” International Interactions 32.4 (2006): 355–384.  
Weak direct ties or hostile pre-conflict relations between belligerents undermine the 
willingness to talk, and therefore the chances of mediation. The study measures direct 
interconnections between belligerents by the number of shared IO memberships. 
Kadera, Kelly M., and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. “Heeding Ray’s Advice: An Exegesis on 
Control Variables in Systemic Democratic Peace Research.” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 22.4 (2006): 311–326.  
This study examines the role of international institutions in the relationship between the 
democratic community’s strength and the use and effectiveness of third-party conflict 
management. 
Ramsbotham, Oliver, Hugh Miall, and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011.  
This book offers a comprehensive study of the theory and practice of conflict resolution. 
The first chapters provide an overview of the study of conflict resolution, origins, methods, 
types of conflicts, types of conflict management, and future perspectives on the field of 
conflict resolution. A chapter is dedicated to the role of IOs in preventing conflict and 
securing peace. 
Shannon, Megan. “Preventing War and Providing the Peace? International Organizations and 
the Management of Territorial Disputes.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26.2 
(2009): 144–163.  
This paper examines whether IOs promote peaceful conflict management. Interventionist 
IOs encourage rival members to attempt peaceful conflict resolution. In addition, 
institutions do not promote bilateral negotiations between members, indicating that the 
socialization and trust-building capabilities of IOs are limited. 
Snyder, Glenn Herald, and Paul Diesing. Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision 
Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1978. 
This book tests political behavior theories by comparing them with the historical record. 
Theories of bargaining, game theory, information processing, decision making, and 
international systems are applied to specific case studies of sixteen crises that occurred 
during a seventy-five-year period. 
Touval, Saadia. “Why the UN Fails.” Foreign Affairs 73.5 (1994): 44–57.  
The study focuses on mediation that has been taken place by the UN. Although the UN has 
had some successful cases, the study claims that the UN is not the most appropriate 
mediator because it represents too many member states, it lacks the resources that are 
necessary for political leverage, and it does not offer credibility. 
Why Do International Organizations Mediate? 
IOs, like other mediators, have different motivations and rationales for their involvement 
(Greig 2005). For instance, IOs are able to facilitate bargaining and secure a solution for the 
belligerents due to resources, leverage, and legitimacy elements (Fearon 1998, Pevehouse and 
Russett 2006, Beardsley 2009). IOs are autonomous institutions with resources, and they are 
well equipped to monitor the behavior of member states (Tallberg, et al. 2013). Shannon, et 
al. 2010 notes that IOs have the leverage to impose sanctions on states that aim to renege on 
an agreement. In addition, the dilemma of a biased or a neutral mediator dominates the 
literature on mediation. To this end, Kydd 2006 highlights that credibility is an important 
element of successful mediation, since the parties need help from a reliable third-party actor. 
Another study by the same author, Kydd 2003, highlights that biased mediators are strong 
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setting of IOs makes them credible mediators that are able to address information asymmetry 
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mediators by providing information to both sides, reducing uncertainty while giving 
incentives to the parties to reach an agreement in order to establish peace in the system 
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CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MEDIATION 
IOs often get involved in dispute settlement aiming to shorten the duration of a conflict, 
produce a peace agreement, or resolve the conflict completely and thus induce a durable 
settlement (Hartzell, et al. 2001). A stream of literature has focused on what makes mediation 
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raises the need for monitoring and enforcement. Doyle and Sambanis 2006 (p. 53) contends 
that the UN considered necessary not only the intervention for resolving a conflict but also 
the reassurance of post-conflict stability. 
Beardsley, Kyle. “Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time 
Inconsistency Problems.” American Journal of Political Science 52.4 (2008): 723–740.  
The study examines the short- and long-term effects of mediation. Although mediation 
offers stability in the short term, violence breaks out again in the long run. Ultimately, the 
promising of monitoring and enforcement creates incentives for the actors to arrive at 
solutions that are not durable. 
Doyle, Michael, and Nicholas Sambanis. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations 
Peace Operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.  
The book offers an analytical overview of the role of the UN in resolving conflicts and 
restoring and maintaining peace. It enhances our understanding of UN peacekeeping 
operations and post-conflict stability by comparing cases that experienced UN 
peacekeeping operations and others that did not. 
Glennon, Michael. “Why the Security Council Failed.” Foreign Affairs 82 (2003): 16.  
The study is an overview of the Security Council actions concerning the US invasion of 
Iraq. The UN’s rules governing the use of force, laid out in the charter and managed by the 
Security Council, had fallen victim to geopolitical forces. 
Regan, Patrick, and Aysegul Aydin. “Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil 
Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50.5 (2006): 736–756.  
This study examines how interventions affect the duration of civil war. Employing 
statistical analysis and a duration model makes two suggestions on this aspect. First, 
diplomacy is critical to conflict management and, second, the timing of the diplomatic 
attempt is just as important as diplomacy itself. 
Schultz, Kenneth. “The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict 
over Rebel Support in Civil Wars.” International Organization 64.2 (2010): 281–312.  
The study examines the role of enforcement in reducing violence after the disputants have 
reached an agreement. It identifies that imperfect monitoring impacts on enforcement 
efforts but that this is often influenced by the parties’ preferences about monitoring. Such 
monitoring processes are often employed by IOs in helping to reduce violence. 
Tallberg, Jonas. “Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European 
Union.” International Organization 56.3 (2002): 609–643.  
The paper challenges the notion that enforcement and management are competing strategies 
for achieving compliance. Instead, a combination makes the EU highly successful in 
combating violations, thus reducing noncompliance to a temporal phenomenon. 
Vasquez, John, ed. What Do We Know about War? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2000.  
This edited volume offers an overview from various scholars about our knowledge and 
understanding of war. It identifies and analyzes those factors that promote the outbreak of 
interstate war on one hand and those factors that promote peace on the other. 
 
